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BURTON ROTHBERG AND STEVEN LILIEN*
Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting:
New Evidence on Corporate Governance
I. INTRODUCTION
EVENTS OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS have refocused attention on the agency prob-
lem in American corporations. Two basic aspects of the modern corporation lead
to the problem: Ownership is largely separated from management, and ownership
itself is usually diffused. Unlike the entrepreneur-dominated firm of older theory,
the owners of publicly listed companies may have only a small fraction of their net
worth invested in any single firm. As Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argue, it
simply may not be worthwhile for these owners to make the effort needed to con-
trol their management hirelings effectively.' As a result, the managers can often put
their own interests and pocketbooks above those of the fund owners. Eugene Fama
provides a counterweight to this line based on an active market for executive ser-
vices.' Nonetheless, the examples of management predation uncovered in the last
few years show that the problem is with us still.
Several strands of action have developed to counteract the unbridled wielding of
management power, including more targeted management contracting, indepen-
dent directors, threatened or actual takeovers, and concentrated ownership.' These
strands can work together or even substitute for one another. This Article focuses
on the concentrated ownership of institutional investors and on their attempts to
restrain management. Institutional investors serve as aggregators of the funds of
smaller investors, providing them with expertise and diversification. Bernard Black
and others have theorized that these institutions have the expertise and economies
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932). Many consider this book to be the seminal work in the area. Berle and Means made this argument at a
time when many academics and the public believed that the Henry Ford-style model of corporate governance
was still predominant.
2. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288, 292-95 (1980).
Fama argues that corporate managers must rationally consider their long-term career paths. Id. at 292-93. In
this light, maximizing shareholder value at their current jobs will lead to greater rewards at other jobs-possibly
at other firms-in the future.
3. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737
(1997). This is an excellent introduction for readers interested in economic thinking on the subject.
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of scale required to provide needed oversight of management.' Of course, legal and
cultural obstacles may prevent this oversight from occurring. Nonetheless, these
obstacles can be changed. In fact, the data for this Article comes from one such
change in the regulatory landscape-a change that was specifically designed to en-
courage activism by institutional shareholders.
This Article restricts itself to a subset of institutional investors: the mutual funds.
We select this subset because of its large size-mutual funds own about twenty-
four percent of U.S. equities'-and also because two new datasets about this activ-
ity have appeared in the public domain. According to Black,6 Alan Palmiter,7 and
Mark Roe,8 mutual funds have greater potential for active corporate governance
than banks, insurance companies, or corporate pension funds. Their argument is
that monitoring management is often constrained by conflicts of interest with
other goals of the institutional investor. Mutual funds are less likely to have these
conflicts of interest. By law, each mutual fund must have its own board of trustees,
and these trustees are legally bound to represent the interests of fundholders. Addi-
tionally, mutual funds are marketed by their performance. If superior governance
can in fact improve a company,9 it should be in the mutual fund's interest to un-
dertake it.
But do the mutual funds undertake this oversight? And if they do, how is this
oversight expressed? Until now, there has been only anecdotal or survey evidence.
Palmiter offers examples from the financial press.' ° Gile Downes interviews mutual
fund executives and finds they generally do not feel that shareholder activism adds
value." But how do they act on these views? No broad dataset was available.
One way owners can exercise their governance is through the formal process of
proxy voting. Voting on issues put to shareholders is an important responsibility of
ownership. For small shareholders, this may be the only part of corporate govern-
ance in which they participate. Shareholders normally vote on key issues, such as
4. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 569 (1990).
5. These numbers are partially estimated. See infra Table 1.
6. Black, supra note 4, at 601-03.
7. Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419,
1435-40 (2002).
8. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE 119-21 (1994).
9. The question as to whether shareholder activism and the possibility of enhanced governance actually
improve corporate performance is not settled. Stuart Gillan and Lisa Starks list 23 studies on the issue and find
divided results. Stuart L. Gillan & Lisa T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical
Evidence, 2 CONTEMP. FIN. DIG. 10, 21-28 (1998), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=663523. Paul MacAvoy
and Ira Millstein attempt to quantify this effect and find a statistically significant return to good governance.
PAUL W. MAcAvoY & IRA M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 43-65 (2003).
We have research in progress that indicates a substantial return to shareholder activism at smaller companies.
Contact us at burt@rothberg.net for details.
10. Palmiter, supra note 7, at 1437.
11. GILE R. DOWNES, JR. ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 34 (1999), availa-
ble at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ghubbard/Papers/DHHInst-investProj.AEI_12_99.pdf.
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the election of directors, approval of auditors, CEO compensation, and issues in-
volving mergers or takeovers. Management proposes most of the issues, but recent
years have seen an increase in the number of issues concerned shareholders have
raised. Many of the shareholder-raised issues concern the operation of the firm,
particularly on social and ethical issues, as well as matters of general governance. In
many cases, the shareholder vote is nonbinding; the board can, and sometimes
does, act against a shareholder majority. 2
In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated two new
rules that shed light on how the mutual funds are using the proxy process. The first
rule requires funds to draw up and make public a set of policies on how they will
make decisions on proxy votes. 3 The second rule requires them to disclose how
they actually vote. 4 This Article analyzes the results of these rules and uses the
results as evidence for certain questions important to the corporate-governance
discussion.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Section II describes the
institutional background to the new rules and resulting datasets. Section III de-
scribes and analyzes the proxy-voting policy disclosures. Section IV describes the
proxy-voting dataset. Section V uses the voting tabulations to answer questions
about how mutual funds operate as corporate owners. We conclude and suggest
further research in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The past twenty years have seen a major increase in the equity assets under man-
agement of institutional investors, particularly of public mutual funds. From 1984
to 2004, the equity assets of mutual funds have grown from $83 billion to $4.49
trillion.'" During that time, the number of equity and equity-hybrid funds has
grown from 548 to 5,060.16 Some of this growth is a direct result of the increase in
stock prices during the period, but there has also been a major increase in new
investments by fundholders. As stock investment has become a more important
option for households' savings and retirement assets, net inflows to equity and
equity-hybrid mutual funds rose from $5.5 billion in 1984 to a high of $321 billion
12. In a telephone communication with author Rothberg, Mr. Elliot Schwartz of the Council of Institu-
tional Investors claimed that such occurrences are widespread. As an extreme example, he noted that Maytag
Corp. ignored a majority vote to declassify for six years.
13. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management, Securities
Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 86,826, at 87,143 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/final33-8188.htm [hereinafter "Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies"].
14. id.
15. See infra Table I for details and sources.
16. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 63 (45th ed. 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2005-factbook.pdf.
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in 2000.17 Net inflows came down sharply in the bear market after that, but re-
bounded to $277 billion in 2004.8
One result of these trends is that institutional investors generally-mutual funds
in particular-have become larger percentage owners of U.S. corporate equities. At
the end of 2004, mutual funds held about twenty-four percent of U.S. stock market
capitalization. 9 Much of the existing literature assumes that the existence of large-
block owners can be a possible control mechanism to mitigate the agency problem.
But do large-block owners actually perform this function?
Questions like these have important implications for American corporate per-
formance. If owners abdicate their responsibilities in overseeing their investments,
agency problems will develop, and the value of stock ownership will consequently
fall. The rise of index mutual funds, which invest passively in the full market or in a
defined sector, has increased the potential for these problems. Actively managed
funds, if they dislike a company's governance, can at least sell the stock-the "Wall
Street walk." The resulting decline in the firm's value may lead to self-correcting
events. Index funds are wedded to a fixed basket and have no such flexibility.2
There is also a suspicion among some observers that mutual funds have incen-
tives not to act against sitting management. According to this theory, mutual fund
companies have conflicts of interest with their non-mutual fund business. A mu-
tual fund company will normally have other asset-management businesses, such as
pension fund or 401(k) management. Mutual fund executives are forced to con-
sider the interests of these other businesses. If the fund is a division of a diversified
financial services company, the conflicts of interest may extend to far larger profit
centers such as investment banking and securities trading. Aggressively confronting
management, the theory goes, would endanger these other businesses. Also, bad
relationships with management might limit analyst access and result in poorer
trading performance.
Until recently, some in the corporate-governance community thought mutual
funds were not taking the proxy-voting process seriously enough. Hard data was
unavailable, but anecdotal evidence indicated that some funds did not even bother
to vote. Others were suspected of voting uncritically with management on all is-
sues, In the post-Enron era, these suspicions received wide airing.
17. Id. at tables 11, 12, and 18. For this calculation, the authors assumed that hybrid equity/bond funds
were invested 65% in equities.
18. Id.
19. This number is up from about 4.8% in 1984. See infra Table 1.
20. Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN.
ECON. 293, 300 (1999). Moreover, because the object of an index fund is to replicate its index at low cost rather
than outperform the index, the fund may not even have an incentive to monitor management. Id. at 305. See
infra Table 3 for additional information.
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The SEC had been following these concerns for many years. In 1980, SEC staff
prepared a report that addressed some of these issues." On September 20, 2002, the
SEC proposed rules to address them.2 The SEC apparently agreed with some of the
criticism. It was clear about the intent of the new rules:
Traditionally, mutual funds have been viewed as largely passive investors, re-
luctant to challenge corporate management on issues such as corporate govern-
ance. Funds have often followed the so-called "Wall Street rule," according to
which an investor should either vote as management recommends or, if dissat-
isfied with management, sell the stock. . . . Recent corporate scandals have
created renewed investor interest in issues of corporate governance and have
underscored the need for mutual funds and other institutional investors to fo-
23cus on corporate governance.
The new rules apply to all investment companies registered under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 whose assets under management
exceed $100 million and require them to do the following:
* Draw up and disclose a set of policies for deciding how to vote their proxies.
The form and content of these policies was left to the fund's discretion. The
SEC gave examples of possible topics to address, but there was no requirement
for funds to include any specific issue. The rules require that policy documents
be disclosed in the fund's Statement of Additional Information and posted on
the SEC's website.
* Draw up and disclose a set of procedures on how the proxy-voting process will
be carried out. Again, there was no guidance favoring any particular type of
process.
* Draw up and disclose procedures on how the fund will deal with potential
conflicts between the interests of the fund and those of the fund company or
its management. Again, the content of the procedures, including which con-
flicts of interest are considered, was left unspecified.
* Disclose its vote on each proxy for all companies in its portfolio. The disclo-
sures had to be made by August 31, 2004, for the previous twelve months. The
form of the disclosures was left open but had to include the following:
What company was making the disclosure and what the nature of the pro-
posal was;
21. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 60-63
(1980).
22. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Records by Registered Management Investment Compa-
nies, Securities Act Release No. 8131, Exchange Act Release No. 46,518, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,739, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,828 (proposed Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8131.
htm.
23. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 13, at 87,144-45 (internal citations omitted).
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* Which group initiated the proposal (management, shareholders, or the
fund itself);
* Whether the fund voted on the proposal;
* How the fund voted; and
• Whether the fund voted for or against management. 4
Table 2 describes the timeline of the rule's proposal and adoption.
The comment period after the rule's proposal was unusually active. According to
the SEC, its "proposals resulted in an extraordinary level of public interest and
vigorous debate and over 8,000 comment letters."2"
Many fund companies opposed the new rule. 6 During the comment period, they
voiced several threads of complaint. First, they noted that preparing the new poli-
cies and disclosures added to their costs. Second, some funds thought investors did
not want or need the new information. Third, they thought that disclosing their
actual votes would make them potential targets for single-issue special-interest
groups, particularly on social and ethical issues unrelated to the economic mission
of the corporation. Nevertheless, the rule was made effective on April 14, 2003.27
III. DATASET ONE: PROXY-VOTING POLICY STATEMENTS
We collected the proxy-voting policy disclosures from the SEC website28 or from
the individual funds' websites. All of the policy statements are textual; they include
no data tables or databases. The statements vary widely in size and content. We
examined the disclosures of the top ten mutual fund families based on equity as-
sets. These fund families account for about two-thirds of the industry total assets
under management. Data on equity assets comes from a variety of sources, includ-
ing Morningstar and the Mutual Fund Fact Book.29
A mutual fund company has to decide at what level to make the proxy-voting
decision. Each fund family in this dataset made proxy decisions at an aggregate
level, either by the fund family itself or by the entity that managed the fund's assets.
The decisions were not made by the individual fund trustees or management. Be-
cause all families had many funds-some in the hundreds-proxies could be voted
as a block across all the manager's funds. In fact, AIM was the only fund company
to specify that different funds might be able to vote oppositely on a proxy.35 A fund
managed by a particular manager would vote the same way on an issue whether the
fund was long-term or short-term oriented and whether it was an actively managed
fund or an index fund. Eight of the ten fund families had one policy statement for
24. Id. at 87,143.
25. Id. at 87,146 (internal citation omitted).
26. Id. at 87,148.
27. Id. at 87,142.
28. See http://www.sec.gov.
29. Table 3 lists these data sources.
30. Id.
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all their funds. One family, Fidelity, had two very similar statements.3 1 Another
family, Janus, used the services of many managers with their own policy state-
ments, four of which are included in this Article?2
The statements vary greatly in length and comprehensiveness, ranging from 30
to 450 lines of text. All the statements lay down a general principle that the interests
of the fund holders would be preeminent and that all proxies would be voted in a
way to maximize fundholder value. We picked through the statements and created
data tables to summarize the issues the funds thought were important and how
they would vote. There was substantial variation in the level of detail disclosed.
Also notable was the amount of exclusionary boilerplate. Virtually every fund made
it clear that its guidelines could be contravened for stated and unstated reasons. In
spite of the broad leeway in content the SEC allowed, there were numerous com-
mon themes.
Table 4 describes the voting procedures used at the ten largest fund families. The
most common way of organizing the voting decision was to create a committee of
more senior fund management company executives (as opposed to employees of
the fund itself) to draw up guidelines on voting policies and to oversee the voting
process. In matters that were routine or on votes in which the guidelines were clear,
the actual voting decision was made at a lower level. This could be a fund's portfo-
lio manager or even an analyst, but more typically the fund would outsource to an
independent proxy-voting service, which was sometimes unnamed but was often
Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS). The service would apply the fund's guide-
lines, vote the proxy, and keep all voting records. In cases where there were no
guidelines or where the fund manager wanted to vote in contravention of the
guidelines, the matter would go to the overseeing committee. In a few cases, the
matter would go to the fund's CEO or general counsel.
The SEC also required the funds to create procedures for handling conflicts of
interest.33 The funds' response to this is shown in Table 5. This section of the dis-
closures was typically short, averaging only eighteen lines. The typical procedure
for resolving corporate conflicts is to send the conflict before a more senior com-
mittee to rule. The type of corporate conflict most mentioned was a potential rela-
tionship with the fund's parent company. In cases of a potential conflict of interest
between the proxy vote and the individual doing the voting, the normal procedure
was for the individual to recuse herself.
The conflict-of-interest issue raises the question of whether the funds vote in the
interest of their fundholders or with consideration to the other parts of the fund
company's interests. These published fund disclosures support the independence
argument; mutual funds claim they vote on behalf of their investors. Nonetheless,
31. Fidelity Investments, Fidelity Proxy Voting Guidelines (all Fidelity funds except equity index funds)
and (Fidelity equity index funds only), 2004.
32. Janus Capital Group, Statement of Additional Information, various funds, 2004.
33. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 22, at 87,146-47.
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the overall lack of specificity gives the impression the funds were just as concerned
about the need to cover themselves from future criticism or even litigation. We will
test the hypothesis of fund independence in the voting data.
Tables 6 through 8 summarize the funds' policies on substantive issues. Table 6
concerns antitakeover issues. This is an area of broad agreement among the ten
fund families. Virtually all were opposed to takeover defenses. Eight of the ten were
against dual classes of common stock?4 Seven were against supermajority voting3"
and classified boards?6 Five of the ten were in favor of restrictions on poison pills,37
and two favored anti-greenmail action." One fund, T. Rowe Price, did not mention
any of these specific issues but did claim to oppose antitakeover strategies. The
unity of the funds on antitakeover issues is the strongest pattern we identify across
the various voting issues in the database.
This opposition to antitakeover tactics is both intellectually and practically im-
portant. It further supports the argument that the funds' primary motivation is
increasing the value of their holdings. It shows that the funds are willing to con-
front sitting management on an issue that cuts clearly into management's self-
interest. Practically, this opposition to antitakeover measures may already be influ-
encing management behavior. During 2003, when these policies were drawn up,
the number of takeover defenses among the S&P 500 decreased by about four
percent. 9
Table 7 concerns executive compensation. Three of the fund families said they
would generally go along with the board's recommendation, and three others
would do so unless the compensation was "excessive."4 On the other hand, the
funds were against specific types of compensation they thought was unfair. Seven
were opposed to repricing existing employee stock options.4 Morgan Stanley, in an
interesting twist, said it would agree to repricing, but only if the employee was
given options of equal value, not equal shares. 2 Five were against issuing employee
34. Dual-class common is an ownership structure in which one class of stock, often controlled by the
founders or management, has equal economic interest but superior voting powers.
35. Supermajority voting is a governance structure in which a greater than 50% majority (often 75%) is
needed to accept a takeover offer.
36. A classified board is one in which the election of the board of directors is staggered over time, often to
prevent takeover attempts.
37. A poison pill is a device meant to prevent a hostile takeover by increasing takeover costs, often through
the issuance of new shares that carry severe redemption penalties.
38. Greenmail is the practice of buying a stake in a target company and then getting the company to buy
back its own shares at a premium to prevent a takeover.
39. Press Release, TrueCourse, Companies Dismantle Takeover Defense Arsenals in 2003 (Jan. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/2003-year-endreview.pdf.
40. See Table 3, infra, for data sources.
41. Repricing is the practice of lowering the strike price on executive stock options after a company's stock
has fallen. Some investors think the practice rewards management failure.
42. See Table 7, infra.
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options with strike prices below the actual market, and two others would restrict
any such discount to fifteen percent.43
Importantly, eight of the ten mentioned some dilutive bound on issuing stock
options. The actual size of the bound ranged from one percent to two percent per
year." Many companies allowed for greater dilution for growth companies than for
mature ones. This level of dilution is quite restrictive relative to many technology
companies and might lead to serious conflict with managers.
Policies concerning corporate control and capital structure are shown in Table 8.
All the funds specified that they would consider voting to withhold authority from
a board if it did not have a majority of independent directors.45 Other than failure
to discharge their duties, this was the most often stated reason the funds gave for
voting to withhold. Five of the top ten funds also wanted a majority-or all-of
their boards' compensation, audit, and nominating committees to be independent
directors. Although most of the funds would support management on its choice of
auditor, four of the ten wanted to restrict the auditor's nonaudit business with the
company.46 There was no mention of policy toward companies that had restated
their financial statements or that suffered from a poor internal control system.
All but four of the fifteen managers had some sort of policy restricting their
support for changes in a company's capital structure. 47 Four of them would be
opposed to increases in common shares that would more than double (triple for
Fidelity) the number of outstanding shares. Two said they would deal with them
case by case. These are broad guidelines and indicate that the funds are willing to
give corporate management a wide berth on capital-structure issues that do not
specifically involve takeovers or other control issues. Note that five specifically
mentioned opposition to "blank check" preferred stock issuance, a technique often
used as an antitakeover measure. We found no mention of restrictions on changes
in debt. In all, we find that the funds' policies on capital-structure issues leave most
cases to management's discretion.
Finally, there was little support for a social or political activist agenda. Three of
the fund families specifically said they would vote with management. Fidelity said it
would abstain. Several others either did not mention the issue or passed it off to the
ISS guidelines. It is important to remember that the fear of such special-interest
conflicts was a major reason for fund opposition to the new proxy-voting rules. So
far at least, the funds appear to be coping well. The funds' attitude toward these




45. See Table 8, infra.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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IV. DATASET TWO: PROXY VOTES
The funds' lists of their actual votes were released by August 31, 2004, for the
previous twelve months of voting. This data was made available both to the SEC
and to fundholders, usually on the fund's website. The SEC decided not to require
any specific format for the data presentation. Some funds have set up their websites
so that an interested party can easily find how the fund voted on a specific vote, but
downloading all the votes into a database is more difficult. On the SEC website, all
votes are in one place but stored in textual format. Extracting this data required
writing a computer program that could parse the text documents and create a data
table. Because most fund families had different text formats, separate programs had
to be written for each. With text-parsing programs it is impossible to ensure that all
data are accurately processed. Errors and inconsistencies in spelling, indentation, or
alignment can lead to corrupted data. Our error checking and hand verification
gives us confidence that our database has extremely high accuracy for all fund fam-
ilies except one. A sample of typical text input is shown in Table 9.
In order to get a somewhat wider selection of funds that will go to the research
questions below, our database contains five of the large fund families, four other
fund families that are small parts of large financial services companies, and six
"long-term stock pickers" who tend to hold a small selection of stocks for many
years. We eliminated stocks that do not trade on U.S. exchanges because the proxy-
voting rules and procedures are often vastly different between the United States and
other countries. We did this by eliminating all stocks without a proper U.S. CUSIP
(Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures) or ticker. Note that
we left ADR (American Depositary Receipt) securities in the database. We thought
that since ADR securities are subject to SEC regulation, they are at least partly
within the scope of the U.S. legal system. We also eliminated any intrafund family
holdings. (Some funds in some families hold shares of other funds in the family
and are thus entitled to vote in those funds.)
After a proper database had been created, duplicate votes were eliminated.
Duplicates occurred because a company might be in the portfolios of more than
one of the funds in a family. This is particularly true for large-cap firms; some
companies were in more than twenty funds of several fund families. A table of
summary statistics for five of the top fund families is shown in Table 10.
V. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Question One: Did the Mutual Funds Vote Their Proxies and
When Did They Vote Against Management?
The major mutual funds studied here did vote their proxies. The average of all five
funds was around ninety-eight percent. Because public data for prior years does
not exist, it is unknown whether the funds have always voted at this level or
whether the new required disclosures have altered their behavior. Nonetheless, the
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record in 2004 would seem to indicate that the funds are taking this part of their
ownership responsibilities seriously.
Second, the major fund families voted their funds as a block. In the case of
Fidelity, we recorded 192,451 separate votes by all funds on all issues.4" We counted
only 1,573 cases in which one fund voted differently from another on a proposal-
0.8% of the total. Many of these were cases in which one fund voted "against" and
another voted "abstain," suggesting a possible communication or clerical error.
The five large mutual funds voted against management an average of seventeen
percent of the time. This data ranged from a high of twenty-nine percent at Van-
guard to a low of eight percent at T. Rowe Price. In examining the data, we could
uncover no obvious simple patterns, such as "vote with management on all board
elections." This lack of simple global rules provides evidence that the funds voted
individual proposals on their merits rather than applying a single standard.
Value Maximizing and Principal-Agent Issues
In the proxy policy disclosures, the funds were clear about their desire to oppose
management on issues that directly affect the value of their investments. The votes
reflect this intent. Table 11 describes how the big five funds voted on certain issues.
Because reading all of the more than 100,000 proposals was infeasible, a computer-
ized search was conducted to isolate issues deemed important. For example, one
issue that has been commented on is excessive executive severance payments, the
so-called golden parachutes. To isolate these, we searched all the proposals for the
word severance. These records were isolated and hand examined for relevance. They
were then tabulated in Table 11.
Although the average vote was seventeen percent against management, there
were much higher percentages in areas highlighted in the proxy policy statements.
For example, the funds voted against management more often on antitakeover is-
sues. Searching through the words used for typical takeover defenses, we found a
total of 481 proposals. The funds voted against management fifty-nine percent of
the time on these issues, including a seventy-percent vote against management on
poison pills.
The funds also voted more often than average against management on issues of
executive compensation, voting against thirty-four percent of the time. Interest-
ingly, the funds voted "no" on forty-seven percent of stock-option compensation
proposals but on only nine percent of bonus compensation proposals. On the ques-
tion of executive severance payments, or golden parachutes, the funds voted "no"
sixty-seven percent of the time.
On other important issues, the results were less clear. The funds voted thirty-one
percent against proposals to issue additional common stock. This might indicate
VOL. 1 NO. 1 2006
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that the funds were protecting the value of their assets from dilution. Many of these
issuances, however, were likely associated with stock-option compensation pack-
ages, so these results may simply verify the compensation votes. Likewise, the funds
voted twenty-nine percent against preferred stock issuances. We were unable to
determine from the proposals how many of these were "blank check" preferred,
normally used as an antitakeover device.
Corporate Governance and Control Issues
On votes regarding the election of directors, the funds voted against management
fourteen percent of the time. This data ranged from a high of twenty-seven percent
at Vanguard to a low of four percent at Fidelity. The funds did not provide a reason
for rejecting a board nominee. In the proxy policy disclosures, however, the reason
most often cited was that the funds planned to vote against boards without a ma-
jority of independent directors. This moderately high level of voting against boards
is at least consistent with the funds' desire to achieve this governance goal.
Operational and Social/Ethical Issues
In the policy disclosures, several funds mentioned that they did not wish to look
over management's shoulder on operational issues. In fact, management proposed
few purely operational issues. On one such issue, auditor ratification, a large por-
tion of the funds voted strongly with management-ninety-four percent-to ratify
the existing auditor.
In the proxy policy statements, all funds indicated they would be wary of share-
holder social or ethical proposals. This was also borne out in the voting data. Of the
327 proposals isolated in the database, there were only seventeen (five percent)
"for" votes. The low percentage of "for" votes holds throughout all types of ethical
proposals, with the exception of fair labor treatment proposals, which received
fifty-percent approval.
Question Two: Do Voting Patterns Vary with the Type of Investment Manager?
There are reasons to believe that different types of mutual fund managers will have
different proxy-voting patterns. Certain managers, which we will call long-term-
stock pickers, tend to hold positions in stocks for a relatively long time-sometimes
for many years. Often, these managers have relatively fewer stocks in their portfo-
lios than other mutual funds of similar size. Their approach is to conduct in-depth
research on and monitoring of these companies and invest two to ten percent of
their assets in each. Some of these managers have had considerable success; a few
have become household names among followers of investing. We hypothesize that
these managers will vote more often with management than the average fund man-
ager. We expect that a part of what these managers like in the companies they own
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is the quality of management. If one is buying a company for three to five years,
one had better have confidence in its leadership.49
To get a sample of managers in this category, we used six funds. These funds
were featured in the October 22, 2004, issue of the Wall Street Journal as exemplars
of this type."°
Approximate Assets Number of Stocks
Fund (S Billion) Voted On
Legg Mason Value Trust 10.5 33
Clipper Fund 6.9 20
Fidelity Dividend Growth
Fund 18.7 120
Sequoia Fund 4-4 17
Torray Fund 0.9 49
White Oak Growth Stock 1.6 18
Table 12 shows the proxy-voting results for these six funds compared with the
average of the big five. These funds voted with management ninety-five percent of
the time, compared with only eighty-one percent for the big five, supporting the
hypothesis. Many readers will know that these six funds have had excellent per-
formance; we are not implying any relationship between voting patterns and
performance.
Another possible relationship between investing style and proxy voting might be
in the difference between active and passive investing. Active managers have the
option of selling a stock if they do not like management; index funds have no such
option. This might lead one to hypothesize that index fund managers might be
holders of some stocks in whose management they have little confidence. Note that
the Vanguard Group, the leader in index mutual funds, has the highest rate of
voting against management. On the other hand, because the goal of an index fund
is to replicate the target index at the lowest possible cost, one could hypothesize
that index managers would not want to spend the money to vote effectively.
To test this hypothesis, we attempted to pick at random one index fund and one
actively managed fund from each of the big five fund families. Unfortunately, we
could not locate any pure index funds in two of the big five, Janus and Putnam. We
replaced these families with Merrill-Lynch and AIM/Invesco. The results are shown
in Table 13. The index funds voted against management thirteen percent of the
49. The managers we are considering do not make a business of hostile takeovers. Naturally, we would
expect that managers who participate in hostile takeovers would vote the opposite. These tend to be mostly
hedge funds and private equity rather than mutual funds.
50. Karen Damato, How Some Mutual-Fund Hotshots Fell Behind: Managers With Great Records Make Big
Bets and Hang Tough When They Hit a Rough Patch, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at C1.
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time, compared with eleven percent for the actively managed funds. This difference
is small and may not reflect the index versus actively managed distinction. The
difference is also wholly attributable to the Vanguard Group, a leader in indexing
and the family that voted most often against management. Other authors have
speculated that cultural factors might influence voting, and some believe that Van-
guard has a particularly independent culture.5'
Question Three: Do the Voting Decisions of the Funds Appear
To Be Influenced by Nonfund Business Relationships?
All the large fund families claim that they vote their proxies for the benefit of their
fund holders-they vote so as to maximize the value of their holdings. Is this true?
The general press has speculated that mutual funds vote to further the interests of
the fund company, including its nonfund businesses. Gerald Davis and Han Kim
analyze the votes of funds in companies in which they do asset-management busi-
ness.52 They find that in the aggregate, funds are no less likely to vote against man-
agement in client firms.5" On certain policy issues, however, such as poison pills
and option expensing, they do find a greater likelihood to vote with management
on shareholder proposals.5 4
Four of the big five fund families used in the previous analysis are largely asset-
management companies. These four do more than pure mutual funds-pension/
retirement management, for example. Mutual funds and related services, however,
are the core of their businesses. One of them, Putnam, is part of Marsh & McLen-
nan, an insurance brokerage.55 To test whether nonfund businesses are intruding on
proxy-voting decisions, we added a sample of three more financial services compa-
nies. These companies were chosen because their main businesses were in areas
other than mutual funds or asset management generally.
* Goldman Sachs (proprietary trading, capital markets, investment banking)
* Barclays (banking, investment banking, capital markets)
* St. Paul Travelers (insurance)
The technique here is to compare the voting records of the two groups of funds. If
influence by nonfund businesses was a factor, we would expect the companies with
large nonfund interests to be more affected. Table 14 shows the results of this
analysis.
51. See Black, supra note 4, at 562-64.
52. See generally Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand That Feeds Them?:
Business Ties and Proxy Voting 1 (University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=667625.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Putnam provided 14% of Marsh's revenue and net income during 2004. Marsh & McLennan Cos.,
2004 Summary Annual Report 69 (2004), available at http://www.mmc.com/about/Annual-2004.pdf.
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One of the large financial services companies, Barclays, does not disclose its vot-
ing for each individual director. Instead it classifies its vote on the entire board as
either "For," "Withhold," or "Split." This practice reduced the number of elections
in the data. The results of Table 14, however, show that the two groups of firms are
quite similar. The four "mostly mutual fund" families vote with management in
eighty-one percent of the votes while the four "financial services conglomerates"
vote with management in eighty-seven percent. On election of directors, the funds
in large financial services companies voted against management more often by sev-
enteen to thirteen percent. With these results we find no evidence that the funds
are allowing nonfund considerations to affect their proxy-voting decisions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH
The past several years have seen important changes in corporate governance and
control. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires CEOs and CFOs to sign their financial
statements and to document and validate the controls used to prepare these state-
ments.5 6 Several regulatory and certificatory organizations have expressed a prefer-
ence for boards with majority independent directors, often compensated on long-
run performance. Finally, the SEC has instituted new rules encouraging institu-
tional investors to exercise their proxy-voting processes more seriously.
In this Article, we have described and analyzed the new data produced by the
SEC's new rules on proxy votes. We conclude that the mutual funds sampled did
vote their proxies and voted in general accordance with the policies they laid out in
their proxy policy disclosures. In particular, the funds often voted against manage-
ments' recommendations on issues of executive compensation, on board indepen-
dence, and on possible takeovers. The funds generally voted with managements'
recommendations on operational or capital-structure issues. This pattern of voting
is precisely what one would expect in a principal-agent form of corporate govern-
ance, and we conclude that the funds are operating from this model.
Further research needs to be done on institutional investors' approach to boards
of directors. Some observers consider this one of the key factors in improving gov-
ernance. 7 The funds in our sample disclosed their votes, but did not give reasons
for them. Certain institutional investors, including CALpers and Merrill-Lynch,
also disclosed the reasons for their votes. Analysis of this data would be productive.
We also conclude that different types of investment managers have different vot-
ing patterns. In particular, stock pickers with a long investment horizon tend to
vote more with management. It would be useful if a sample of institutions that are
known to specialize in takeovers were examined. It would also be interesting to see
if certain types of voting patterns might precede unusual stock returns. For exam-
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56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302(a)(2), 116 Stat. 745, 777.
57. See MAcAvoY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 9, at 45-46.
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pie, it might be that a rise in votes against management in an out-of-favor company
might lead to management improvement.
Finally, we conclude that there is no evidence to show that mutual funds let the
nonfund parts of their companies influence their votes. This is good news, but our
analysis is based on a relatively small sample. Over time we intend to expand our
proxy-voting database.
TABLE 1" EQUITY ASSETS OF U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS"8
1 2 3 4=3+4+5 5 6=4/5
Percent
Long-Term Exchange- Total Value Held by
Open- Traded, Closed-End of U.S. Mutual
Ended5 9  U.S.-only 6o U.S.-only Total Assets Equities61  Funds
1984 83 0 <10 <86 1,789 4.8%
2004 4490 184 63 4,215 17,254 24.4%
TABLE 2: TIMELINE OF SEC ACTION"
20 September 2002 SEC proposes proxy-voting rules
14 April 2003 New rules adopted
Beginning of period for which proxy votes must
1 July 2003 eventually be disclosed
Proxy-voting policy statements must be filed on new or
1 July 2003 amended registrations
End of period for which proxy votes must eventually be
30 June 2004 disclosed
31 August 2004 Deadline for disclosing proxy votes since Sept. 1, 2003
58. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 16.
59. Id. Table 28. Short-term funds are ignored because they do not invest in equities but in money-market
instruments.
60. Id. Table 12. Exchange-traded and traditional closed-end funds both trade as individual assets on
organized stock exchanges. Closed-end funds are normally actively managed. Conversely, exchange-traded
funds replicate an entire index. Closed-end funds can, and often do, trade at premiums or discounts to net
asset value (NAV). In contrast, exchange-traded funds trade very close to NAV.
61. Flow of Funds Account of the United States: Annual Flows and Outstandings 1975-1984, at 84 (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20050609/annuals/
a1975-1984.pdf; Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flow and Outstandings First Quarter 2005, at 90
(Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20050609/
zl.pdf.
62. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 13, at 87, 142-43.
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TABLE 3: MUTUAL FUND FAMILIES AND POLICY DATA SOURCE
Estimated Percent Length of the
of Total Mutual Source for Proxy- Proxy-Voting
Fund Family Fund Equity Assets Voting Statement Statement (in lines)
Fidelity
(2 statements) 17 Company website 196-250
Vanguard 17 Company website 230
American Funds 12 Company website 162
Putnam 5 SEC website 450
Janus
(4 statements) 3 SEC website 88-300
Franklin-Templeton 3 SEC website 130
AIM 3 SEC website 225
T. Rowe Price 2 Company website 51
Morgan Stanley 2 Company website 135
Oppenheimer/
Mass. Mutual 2 SEC website 30
Total of Top lo 66
Industry Total 1oo
Note: We estimated data on the percent share of each fund company based on a variety of
sources, including Morningstar and the Mutual Fund Fact Book.
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TABLE 4: PROXY-VOTING PROCEDURES
How Many Is the Process
Which Unes in the Described Who Actually Who Do They Use
Investment Proxy-Voting Generally or Makes Proxy Oversees the an Outside
Fund Family Managers Procedure? in Detail? Decisions? Decision? Consultant?
Fidelity (excl. FMR 12 General FMR legal Funds' Board Not
Index Funds) dept. mentioned
An
Fidelity (Index Geode Capital "established An Operations Yes. NameOnly) Management 16 Detailed proxy Comm. of notLLC advisory senior officers mentioned
service"
All managers A Proxy
Vanguard of the fund 25 General TheOversight Notfamily voting group Committee mentioned
The
The American All managers 
The
Fnsof the fund 21 Detailed Manager's Not NotFundsf Investment mentioned mentionedfamily Committee
Committeee
All managers A Committee Yes. Name
Putnam of the fund 30 Detailed A proxy- of not
family voting service Independent mentionedFund Trustees
Janus Capital Portfolio A Proxy- Yes. Name
Janus Management 25 Detailed Voting not
LLC managers Committee mentioned
Enhanced
Investment NotJanus Technologies 20 Detailed ISS mentioned ISS
LLC
Perkins Wolf Portfolio A Proxy- Yes. Name
Janus McDonnell 29 Detailed Voting not
LLC managers Committee mentioned
Comm.
Bay Isle Chief Chaired by Yes. Name
Financial LLC 6o Detailed Investment Chief notOfficer Investment mentioned
Officer
Franklin- All managers Research The proxy




All managers the legal, Not
AIM/Invesco of the fund 33 Detailed investment, ISS
family and finance mentioned
depts.
All managers Portfolio A Proxy
T. Rowe Price of the fund 25 Detailed Port AoProxyISS
family managers Committee
Devolved to
All maagerstheMorgan Stanley All managers the A Proxy
M of the fund 40 General Review ISSDean Witter family company's. Committee
Details not
given.
Oppenheimer All managers An(Mass. Mutual) of the fund 7 General unaffiliated Nt Ntfamily third party menioed metine
Lower Level Committee of
Typical Answer 25 Detailed Managers or Senior Yes, usually
ISS Management ISS
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TABLE 5: CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST (COI) PROCEDURES
What Potential Procedures for Procedures for
Investment How Many Unes COls are Dealing with Dealing with
Fund Family Manager in the Process? Mentioned? Corporate COI Personal COI
Other Fidelity
Fidelity FMR 5 companies' Not described Not described
relationships
Geode Capital 20 Businessrelationship with Not described Not describedFidelity Management LLC Geode
Proxy Committee
All managers in Sales, client does not include Individual recusesVanguard the fund family relationships a with himself
relationships
The Proxy
The American All managers in Fund Director is Committee is Proxy Committee




All managers in Butinshpesn Compliance Individual recuses
thefunnfail 24 Putnam, personal Det.will issue himselfthe fund family or family written reportsbusiness
Janus Janus CapitalManagement LLC 13 None Not described Not described
Attempts to
Enhanced Relationships influence the
Janus Investment 35 with Janus Funds process will be Not described
Technologies LLC reported to the
CEO
Proxy-Voting
Janus Perkins Wolf Committee willMcDonnell LLC 17 None review ill Not described
guideline votes
Corporate or Proxy CommitteeBay Isle Financial is responsible for Individual recusesJC 1 preloni l monitoring and himselfLLC 
relationship resolving
Franklin- All managers in Fund manager isTempleton the fund family o None allowed to make Nonedecision
Benefits
administration,
AIM/Invesco All managers in other business Review by Proxy Individual recusesthe fund family 50 relations, Committee himself
personal
relationships
T. Rowe Price All managers in iB Business or other Responsibility offund familyi relationship the Proxy Not describedthe fund family 18 Committee
ornStanley All managers in NDecided by a
Morgan taey All mandgfamin 8 None Proxy-Review Not described
Dean Witter the fund family Committee
Oppenheimer All managers in
(Mass. Mutual) the fund family 4 None Not described Not described
Relationships
Typical Answer 18 Lines with Other Parts Sent up to Not described
of the Fund's Committee
Parent
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TABLE 9: SAMPLE OF PROXY-VOTING DATA
MORGAN STANLEY ALLOCATOR FUND
3M CO
Ticker: MMM Security ID: 88579YI01
Meeting Date: MAY 11, 2004 Meeting Type: Annual
Record Date: MAR 12, 2004
# Proposal Mgt Rec Vote Cast Sponsor
1.1 Elect Director Edward A. Brennan for Management
1.2 Elect Director Michael L Eskew for Management
1.3 Elect Director W. James McNerney, Jr. For Management
1.4 Elect Director Kevin W. Sharer for Management
2 Ratify Auditors for Management
3 Increase Authorized Common Stock for Management
4 Separate Chairman and CEO Positions against Shareholder
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
Ticker: ABT Security ID: 002824100
Meeting Date: APR 23, 2004 Meeting Type: Annual
Record Date: FEB 25, 2004
# Proposal Management Received Vote Cast Sponsor
1.1 Elect Director Roxanne S. Austin for Management
1.2 Elect Director H. Laurance Fuller for Management
1.3 Elect Director Richard A. Gonzalez for Management
1.4 Elect Director Jack M. Greenberg for Management
1.5 Elect Director Jeffrey M. Leiden for Management
1.6 Elect Director David A. Lord Owen for Management
1.7 Elect Director Boone Powell Jr. for Management
1.8 Elect Director Addison Barry Rand for Management
1.9 Elect Director W. Ann Reynolds for Management
1.1o Elect Director Roy S. Roberts for Management
1.11 Elect Director William D. Smithburg for Management
1.12 Elect Director John R. Walter for Management
1.13 Elect Director Miles D. White for Management
2 Ratify Auditors for Management
3 Drug Pricing Against Shareholder
4 Report on Political Against Shareholder
Contributions/Activities
5 Prohibit Awards to Executives Against Shareholder
6 Report on Operational Impact of HIV/AIDS, Against Shareholder
TB, and Malaria Pandemic
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TABLE 11: VOTES ON CERTAIN ISSUES, BIG FIVE FUND FAMILIES
Number Percent
Number of Against Against
Words Searched For* Proposals Management Management
Executive Compensation
Executive Compensation 319 40 13
Bonus 791 69 9
Incentive Plan 1,103 409 37
Severance 151 104 69
Stock-option Plan 1271 598 47
Total 3,635 1,220 34
Anti-takeovers
Poison (pill) 233 163 70
Classified (board) 31 19 61
Cumulative (voting) 165 82 50
Supermajority (voting) 51 22 43
Dual class (stock) 1 0 0
Greenmail o 0 n/a
Total 481 286 59
Other Issues
(Issue) Common Stock- 1,513 470 31
Preferred Stock 157 46 29
Ratify Auditors 5,311 310 6
Auditor Independence 6 0 0
Percent
Social/Ethical Issues Number of None or for
(Shareholder Only) Proposals For Against Abstain N/A Proposal
Greenhouse or Global
Warming 39 2 24 11 2 5
Equality (human) 5 0 2 2 1 0
Gender (bias) 20 1 15 4 0 5
Sex (preference bias) 17 5 00  2 29
Labor (treatment of) 18 9 9 0 0 0.5
Political (contributions or
similar) 228 0 150 70 4 0
Total 327 17 210 87 9 5
*The first word(s) was the computerized search phrase. The words in parentheses indicate the hand
sorting.
**Many of the proposals of issuance of new common stock were in conjunction with stock-option
incentive plans. Some of this category should go into "Compensation."
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TABLE 12: LONG-TERM STOCK PICKERS VS. BIG FUND FAMILIES
Percent
For Against Total Percent For Against*
Management Management Votes Management Management
Long-Term Stock Pickers
Legg Mason Value Trust 364 19 383 95 5
Clipper Fund 63 3 66 95 5
Fidelity Dividend Growth Fund 1217 65 1282 95 5
Sequoia Fund 131 1 132 99 1
Torray Fund 952 64 1o16 94 6
White Oak Growth Stock 201 16 217 93 7
Totals 2928 168 3096 95% 5%
Big Fund Families
Janus 7231 2154 9385 77 23
Vanguard 19593 8243 27836 70 30
T Rowe Price 25520 2618 28138 91 9
Putnam 7762 2065 9827 79 21
Fidelity 28252 5302 33554 84 16
Totals 88358 20382 108740 81% 19%
*Includes abstain as against.
TABLE 13: VOTING AGAINST MANAGEMENT
INDEX VERSUS ACTIVELY MANAGED
Average Fidelity I Vanguard JAIM/InvescolT. Rowe PriceMerrill-Lynch
Index Fund
Master
Spartan Equity Index Small Cap
Name 50o Inst. Index SPSoo fund 500 Value Trust
Type Large Cap Large Cap Large Cap Large Cap Small Cap
Number of Votes 4,656 4,720 3,965 4,369 989
Number Against
Management 701 992 418 287 104
Percent Against
Management 13 15 21 11 7 11
Actively Managed Fund
AIM Blue Large Cap Small Cap
Name Magellan Wellington Chip Core Grow Value
Type Large Cap Large Cap Large Cap Large Cap Small Cap
Number of Votes 2267 266 1868 951 951
Number Against
Management 181 65 16o 77 75
Percent Against
Management 11 8 24 9 8 8
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TABLE 14:
'MOSTLY MUTUAL FUND' COMPANIES COMPARED
WITH 'MOSTLY NOT MUTUAL FUND' COMPANIES
Four 'Mostly Fund' Four 'Mostly Not Fund'
Total Percent of Total Total Percent of Total
Total Number of
Counted Proposals 90,279 100 30,597 100
Total Votes
With Management 73,540 81 25,642 84
Not with Management 14,764 16 4,447 15
No Vote or N/A 1,976 2 508 2
Votes Initiated by
Management 86,881 100 8,777 100
With Management 71,125 82 6,876 78
Not with Management 13,586 16 1,846 21
No Vote or N/A 2,170 2 55 1
Votes Initiated by
Shareholders 3,398 100 6o8 100
With Management 1,9o8 56 355 58
Not with Management 879 26 188 31
No Vote or N/A 112 3 3 0
Abstain* 499 15 62 10
Votes for Directors
Total 64,047 100 6,361 100
Withheld 8,288 13 1,052 17
*Abstentions are noted separately in shareholder resolutions because they usually
involve social/ethical issues.
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